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Abstract This paper explores the disconnections between anti-trafficking dis-
course and the local experience of responding to human trafficking as indicated in
ethnographic data from Bosnia and Kazakhstan. Using the concept of ‘‘uptake,’’ I
examine how anti-trafficking discourse operates as a master narrative, drawing on
techniques of emotion and logic, as well as a specific type of victim story. I also
consider how, despite an emerging counter discourse that questions the data and
challenges current policy, human trafficking discourse continues to be retold in
media and reproduced in popular culture, often in ways that actually diverge from
the current version of the grand narrative. In contrast to these uncritical represen-
tations, ethnographic data from Bosnia suggest that the master narrative is selective
in how it represents the history of the problem and that it does not ‘‘take up’’
important details about the context that fosters sexual exploitation, despite Bosnia’s
compliance with US policy. Conversely, Kazakhstan suffers a liminal status
regardless of local efforts to prevent the problem from happening within its borders
as well as evidence that the crime is not widespread. While perhaps not mythical, I
suggest that the master narrative contains the stuff of legend as it occupies the
critical spaces of policy, activism and development, leaving open the question of
how to address the nuances and needs of responding to victims of gender violence.
Keywords Trafficking  Kazakhstan  Bosnia  Ethnography  Sexual slavery 
Narrative
E. Snajdr (&)
Department of Anthropology, John Jay College,
899 Tenth Ave., New York, NY 10019, USA
e-mail: esnajdr@jjay.cuny.edu
123
Dialect Anthropol (2013) 37:229–256
DOI 10.1007/s10624-013-9292-3
My Bosnian driver and I froze as the EUFOR1 guard aimed his M-16 directly at our
windshield after we had made a wrong turn among the maze of barbed wire and
concrete barriers zigzagging before the entrance to Eagle Base on the outskirts of
Tuzla. The Austrian soldier continued to train his weapon on us as I gingerly held
out my US passport from the passenger window of our unmarked blue sedan. I cried
out ‘‘I’m American! I have a meeting with Major Houston!’’ The winding and
cryptic path into the base, the home of a multinational peacekeeping force in the
aftermath of the Bosnian conflict, was indeed hard to see, as it was laid out precisely
to prevent a successful terrorist car bomb attack. Upon seeing my credentials and
hearing my explanation, the armed sentinel let us pass toward the main checkpoint.
I was in Bosnia and Herzegovina gathering ethnographic information on human
trafficking interventions and had arranged to meet an official from the US military
contingent at the base about the training of peacekeeping forces on this issue.
Bosnia had been a notorious hotspot of trafficking in persons, as well as a site for
coordinated responses to the exploitation of women in the illicit sex trade. I had
been in Tuzla interviewing local police about their work with trafficking victims and
wanted to learn about the training efforts for peacekeeping forces nearby. With our
hearts still rapidly pounding from the frightening situation of being at gunpoint at
the base’s perimeter post, my companion and I checked in with the officer on duty at
the heavily fortified front gate. After some phone calls and a bit of waiting, we
learned that the public affairs officer had had to cancel, but that he had left the
training materials on a CD-ROM for me. I put the item in my jacket pocket and we
headed out, back to town. When I opened the slender plastic CD case, I quickly
recognized that what I had come so far to see I had seen long before I had ever
gotten there: the 2004 Trafficking in Persons Report, published by the US State
Department. The document was readily available to anyone with internet access at
‘‘state.gov.’’ In Bosnia, I was trying to understand human trafficking as a good
ethnographer, looking for the ‘‘thick description’’ in the messy details of everyday
human experience from which we cull meaning (Geertz 1973). Instead, at Eagle
Base, and in many other ethnographic spaces, I kept finding a master narrative.
From an anthropological perspective, a master narrative is an over-arching
cultural message as well as a framework of knowledge and action. Operating
discursively through textual and other communicative technologies, a master
narrative tries to ‘‘make normal’’ both ideology and action on the broadest and most
pervasive levels and spheres of society. It becomes (or tries to become) the standard
view, what Bamberg (2004) describes as a strategy of legitimization. Exploring how
a master narrative of human trafficking as it is largely defined and utilized in the US
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, among other discursive sites, reveals how it
serves as the standard vision and approach to the problem despite important
intersections of agency, identity, culture and language. Theorizing how the
technologies and practices of this dominant discourse operate and are reproduced
reveals how the master narrative of the anti-trafficking ‘‘community’’ is both iconic
1 EUFOR is the acronym for the military force led by the European Union in charge of security and
stability in post-conflict Bosnia Herzegovina. EUFOR replaced SFOR in 2004 and presently serves as an




and iterative, relying upon some of the very discursive aspects for which it has been
challenged, including its scope, its subject and its modes of documentation, in order
to assert its dominance. I also consider how beneath the master narrative,
ethnography on human trafficking can reveal subtler and more accurate appraisals of
experiences and contexts that depart from the grand discourse. It can also show how
some key experiences of trafficking have been left out of the official account.
Drawing on research from my work as a co-director of an anti-trafficking and
gender violence development project in Kazakhstan in 2003, as well as from
fieldwork I carried out with a team of researchers on trafficking in persons in post-
conflict Bosnia in 2006, I show that the problem of human trafficking is far from
monolithic, most certainly dynamic and context-based, and often linked to a host of
issues that appear to be overlooked or ignored in policy making, in legislation or in
advocacy for people victimized.
The anti-trafficking story and its discontents
The prevailing discourse or master narrative of anti-trafficking contains three main
assumptions put forward by US officials and by many (although not all) of the
NGOs who seek to assist individuals in need of help. The first premise holds that
trafficking-in-persons exists on a massive and ever-increasing scale. The second
premise: human trafficking is the result of a set of legal shortcomings on the part of
other states. And the third suggests that the way to respond to the malady is to
strengthen laws and law enforcement in as many ways as is possible and to
encourage the non-profit sector to assist with helping victims. Essentially, the anti-
trafficking community constructs the problem of human trafficking as a global
crime whose victims include not only women and children exploited by traffickers,
but also the ‘‘rule of law’’ societies of Western Europe and North America.
One can find the iconic story of a victim of human trafficking nicely represented
in a Vanity Fair article written by Junger (2002). In this account, a young Moldovan
woman, we are told, was in the process of seeking a better life for herself and her
family. She found an opportunity to work in Germany as a nanny, but was required
to give her handlers her passport and documents. Thus, trusting but dependent upon
her agents to navigate her way through East Europe, she ended up in Kosovo. Held
captive, she was forced to work as a prostitute, rather than a nanny. In the article, we
learn that her captivity is reinforced by multiple types of desperation and bondage.
In Kosovo, the Moldovan woman, a native Russian speaker, is linguistically
handicapped. She is from the poorest post-Soviet state following the collapse of
communism. She is also no longer in control of her documentation or official
papers. Additionally, any money that she earns from her work is kept by her boss.
The frightening details of experiences similar to the woman in Junger’s Vanity
Fair piece have appeared in cases around the globe, from Thailand to South Korea,
and from the United Arab Emirates to Latin America.2 Whether fleeing severe
2 See for example Joseph (2003) and FSU (2003) for cases from Latin America, Piper (2003) for
Thailand and Utrecht (1994) for Korea and the U.A.E.
Beneath the master narrative 231
123
poverty, confronting bitter unemployment, or escaping war-torn states, stories of
exploited individuals, who leave their homes in search of hope, read as disturbing
experiences of struggle, told mostly by women, who became victimized by
traffickers and who somehow escaped these terrible circumstances with their lives
and their tales. These victims’ accounts can be found in news media, posted on the
websites of NGOs working to help victims, published in reports by international and
government agencies and captured in documentary films and television news shows.
Along with these accounts and images, we find estimates attesting to the significant
scope, frequency and growth of the problem. For example, the US State Department
first reported in 2001 that ‘‘at least 700,000 people, especially women and children
are trafficked each year across international borders’’ (TIP 2001:4). A year later the
estimate given by the official US report ballooned to ‘‘as many as four million’’ (TIP
2002:3). Additionally, maps produced by NGOs, such as the Protection Project,3 or
by international entities, such as The Council of Europe, mark the relationships of
origin, transit and receiving countries, which together depict a grim atlas of global
slavery.
The anti-trafficking movement actually begins quite a few years before Junger’s
Vanity Fair article with the 1994 Utrecht Conference on Traffic in Persons, which
actually called for the decriminalization of prostitution and efforts to improve health
and safety regulations for sex workers worldwide (Murray 1998). Following this
international concern over the issue of sex tourism, however, there emerged what
some scholars have termed an unlikely collaboration between abolitionist feminists
and conservative Christian groups in the United States whose common aim is to
eradicate prostitution (Berman 2006; Weitzer 2007). These two movements lobbied
the US government at the end of the 1990s to create the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act (VTVPA), which Congress first passed in 2000.4 In
addition to a statutory definition of trafficking, this federal legislation inaugurated a
set of official governmental responses to the problem—routinely referred to as the
‘‘three Ps’’—including protection, prosecution and prevention (TIP 2001:9).5 The
act also includes provisions for the funding of international and domestic NGOs and
the training of law enforcement. Working in cooperation with governmental efforts
is a wide array of non-governmental organizations with an equally diverse set of
aims to address the ‘‘three Ps’’ policy. These groups include, but are not limited to,
the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), the Global Alliance Against
3 The Protection Project is a human rights research institute based at the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies.
4 The VTVPA has been reauthorized in 2003, 2005 and 2008. The act expired on October 1, 2011, and is
being considered for reauthorization in 2012.
5 The VTVPA defines severe forms of trafficking as (a) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is
induced by force, fraud, coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained
18 years of age or (b) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision or obtaining of a person for
labor or services through the use of force, fraud or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary
servitude peonage, debt bondage or slavery. The minimum standards of the VTVPA state that (1) a
government should prohibit human trafficking and punish such acts, (2) punishment should be
commensurate with the crime, (3) punishment should not only deter but also reflect the heinousness of the




Trafficking in Women (GAATW), La Strada, the International Justice Mission, Free
the Slaves and the Polaris Project.6 One of the largest organizations focused on
assisting victims of trafficking is the International Office of Migration (IOM), which
receives funding from a range of sources, but notably from USAID through
appropriations from the VTVPA. In addition to support for NGOs, and perhaps less
known to the public, have been various US assistance efforts for the training of law
enforcement and other justice officials around the globe.7
Emerging with this constellation of anti-trafficking stakeholders is a counter
discourse that challenges both the data and the ideological underpinnings in the
official policies of the anti-trafficking paradigm and contextualizes and critiques the
role of non-governmental organizations and government that have influenced it as
propagating a ‘‘moral panic’’ or ‘‘crusade’’ against sex workers (Weitzer 2007).8 For
example, using the term the cultural myth of trafficking, Doezema (2000) was one of
the first critics to interrogate the official story by comparing it to the White Slavery
scare of the late nineteenth century and the passage and outcomes of the 1910 Mann
Act, which she argues was used against sex workers and working class women as
opposed to any non-Western slavers.9 Following Doezema, a few scholars and
journalists have more recently challenged the veracity of the official estimates of the
numbers of people trafficked annually, suggesting that such figures are at best not
provable and at worst exaggerated and misleading (Fiengold 2010; Nathan 2005;
Rothschild 2009; Weitzer 2012; Warren 2010).10 At the same time, critics of the
anti-trafficking movement have detailed what they see as an essentially conservative
stance in the battery of responses to human trafficking that is inherently against any
form of prostitution and which unfairly targets individuals who follow this path of
employment regardless of their circumstances (Berman 2006; Weitzer 2007;
Kempadoo et al. 2005). Bernstein (2010) has also recently connected the anti-
trafficking collaboration between faith-based organizations and secular feminists
with a broader shift in women’s activism toward what she terms ‘‘carceral
feminism’’ or the substitution of criminal justice for social justice in the pursuit of
and subsequent assertions for gender rights in the United States.
6 Much has been written about the politics among and between these organizations and their relationships
to broader ideologies, beliefs and agendas (Berman 2006; Bernstein 2010). La Strada began as Comesha,
an organization founded in 1987 in the Netherlands. There is also ECPAT International, an organization
formed in 1990 to prevent the sexual exploitation of children. Free the Slaves is run by Kevin Bales a
human rights activist and author of Disposable People (Bales 2004).
7 For example, the Albright State Department under Bill Clinton funded gender violence assistance
programs for the former Soviet Union that were first administered by the agency’s Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which preceded the creation of the Trafficking-in-
Persons or TIP Office in 2001 and which were awarded to a variety of NGOs and universities. See King
and Ray (2000) for an overview of international law enforcement training initiatives.
8 The concept of moral panic, as Weitzer points out, is a term of social and political analysis, coming
from the work of Stanley Cohen (1972) and also from Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994). The word
‘crusade’ conjures up organized and militarized efforts to convert and conquer.
9 Doezema notes that the Mann Act was triggered by accounts of the abduction of white women for
prostitution in South America, Africa or Asia by non-Western men and that ‘‘historians are nearly
unanimous in seeing that the actual [number of] cases of such abductions was quite small.’’
10 Weitzer (2007) argues that estimates of an underground and hard to track problem such as trafficking
should not even be made.
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Despite the tropes of ‘‘moral crusade’’ and ‘‘global panic,’’ the US government,
as a point of leadership and of policy, has defined its response to human trafficking
in a manner evidently more purposeful than panic-driven. Using the VTVPA as a
measure and the annual US TIP Report as a medium, the US government has
constructed a global accounting of compliance for other nation states with regard to
trafficking. In addition to victim’s stories and country summaries, the annual TIP
report contains a ranking of countries. Countries whose governments fully comply
with VTVPA are placed in Tier One. Those that do not meet the act’s minimum
standards, but are considered by the United States to be making significant efforts to
bring themselves into compliance, are ranked at Tier Two. In Tier Three, we find
those countries whose governments have yet to make compelling efforts to align
themselves with the stipulations in VTVPA and therefore face the threat of
sanctions by the United States.11 Human trafficking is not the only crime by which
the US ranks other countries. In fact, this tool of foreign policy is used to rate how
other governments have addressed the problem of drug trafficking (Friman
2010:96). However, as Kay Warren notes, TIP’s ranking system is notable in its
effect of shaming other societies (Warren 2010, see also Friman 2010:92). In fact
through TIP rankings, the ‘‘stick’’ approach of sanctions need not even be exercised,
as long as the ‘‘threat’’ is made through published comparisons with exemplary
states. Interestingly, the United States itself was not included in the TIP Report
rankings until 2010, a full 9 years since the system was created. Clearly through the
TIP Report’s rankings is a strategy on the part of the US government to manage and
shape the criminal justice landscapes of transitional states.
Making a narrative ‘‘Master’’: technologies of emotion and logic
Scholars in a number of disciplines have used the term ‘‘master narrative’’ to
describe a range of normative conceptualizations and sociopolitical phenomena,
such as dominant environmental discourses (Harper 2001), historically based gender
and power relations (Erler 2003), media characterizations of military interventions
(Hackett and Zhao 1994), teacher sex scandals and pedophilia (Cavanagh 2008),
and broad intellectual revolutions, like ‘‘the Enlightenment’’ (Gikandi 2001).12 All
of these approaches conceptualize master narrative as a Lyotardian concept: a
preexisting form of interpretation which is socioculturally reproduced and thus
normalized (Lyotard 1984, Bamberg 2003).13 A master narrative is directed from
and ultimately constructed and reproduced as social reality by dominant institutions,
agents and systems. While ‘‘master narratives’’ have been described as frames from
within which oppositions to dominant structures and power formations often
11 Tier Three states could also, the Act reads, face US opposition to assistance from international
financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (Public Law 2000:21).
12 A recent symposium at Brooklyn Law School was titled ‘‘Writing the Master Narrative for U.S. Health
Policy’’(Brooklyn Law School 2012).
13 Lyotard’s concept of ‘‘meta-narrative’’ is an idea, now standard in post-structural theory that, along




emerge, here I want to use the case of human trafficking to explore and to tease
apart the characteristics and components of the master narrative as a genre (Bakhtin
1986) and to consider how the dominant narrative is ‘‘taken up’’ in popular culture
and to compare it with data that do not fit into its framework. The term ‘‘uptake’’
originally comes from speech act theory and it refers to the perlocutionary force, or
the effect an utterance has on an interlocutor in face-to-face conversation (Schegloff
1982). ‘‘Uptake’’ is also used in the area of language acquisition to describe the
retrieval of information already acquired by learners. Roberts and Sarangi (2003)
expand the analytical power of the term to include the understanding of a particular
linguistic concept and its use in professional practice. I further expand the meaning
to suggest that ‘‘uptake’’ is not only an acknowledgment or understanding of a
discourse but also in the case of a dominant discourse, its adoption or appropriation
as a standard mode of communication, knowledge and practice. A basic feature of a
master narrative is that while there may be an initial single author responsible for its
creation, this original source becomes irrelevant as it is pushed forward,
institutionalized and ‘‘read’’ by others. Take, for example, the policy of contain-
ment, the blueprint for the US relationship with the Soviet Union after Second
World War that emerged from the Moscow diplomat George Kennan’s analytically
insightful ‘‘long telegram.’’ What began as a diplomatic strategy, which initially
cautioned that the United States distinguishes carefully between Russian culture and
Soviet power in formulating foreign policy, ushered in a culture of Cold War
paranoia, practices and international conflicts which went far beyond the author’s
initial ideas.14
Put another way, the components of the master narrative and its discursive
technologies that reproduce it play crucial roles in its representation and
dissemination, making it ‘‘master’’ over alternative individual or collective
perspectives or accounts.15 For example, most of the technologies of the anti-
trafficking narrative blend emotion, authority and reason in the act of representation.
On the one hand, the narrative must attract attention, gain a spotlight and to do this,
usually as an introductory process, it attempts to elicit spontaneous feelings from
recipients: intrigue, alarm and outrage. The estimated staggering figures of human
trafficking victims suggest a far-reaching crisis and epidemic of exploitation,
particularly of a crime that is not committed as an explicit act of violence.16 At the
same time, authority and logic provide the frame through which information gets
14 Kennan’s analytical telegram was fleshed out further in an anonymous Foreign Affairs article and
‘‘came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history’’ (Gaddis
2011:249).
15 Somewhat parallel to this idea is Michael Warner’s work on publics and counter publics, with the
latter being much more subordinate, in fact subaltern, and thus perhaps uninterpretable (Warner 2005).
16 Scholars and practitioners working with gender violence and on other kinds of interpersonal violence
might say that there is evidence of underreporting these types of abuse and exploitation. My own work in
Kazakhstan among Muslim women activists, for example, found that some women were quite reluctant to
report domestic violence to law enforcement (Snajdr 2005, 2007). At the same time, demographers,
health officials and criminologists might note how relatively small the estimates of human trafficking
victims are compared to cases of domestic violence (1.3 million in the United States—National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence) or to public health problems such as type 2 diabetes (25.8 million
Americans—U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2011).
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read as official documentation. In order for it to appeal to its recipients’ ideas of
reason, master narratives must be built up from an accepted source of expert
information. In a move to indicate systematic and cumulative research, the State
Department has revised its TIP report over the course of several years. The act of
revision suggests that logic and reason are at work in the process of defining the
problem. In 2002, for example, the estimate was 4 million victims globally. The
2003 report included an estimate of between 700,000 and 900,000. The 2004 report
states ‘‘between 600,000 and 800,000 are trafficked annually.’’ In the same report,
the estimate for the United States also fell from 50,000 (in 2002) to 17,000 annually.
Both UNESCO and the US Government Accounting Office have criticized the
official numbers and called for better data gathering in support of the idea that the
crime of trafficking can be accurately calculated (GAO 2006).17 Revision and
further research suggest credibility, self-reflection, a need to be precise and a drive
to get it right. At the same time, however, the newer figures provided in the TIP
report continue to appeal to emotion and alarm. From 2005 to the present year, no
definitive annual numbers for human trafficking are given in the TIP report. Instead,
previous estimates of sexual slavery are conflated with an estimate of global ‘‘forced
labor’’ reported by the International Labor Organization (ILO) the UN Agency
charged with addressing labor standards. This number is 12.3 million persons,
including people enslaved in sexual servitude (TIP 2005:7). Staggering estimates
are a powerful tool of master narrative construction, so rather than tamping down
the number of persons trafficked as sex slaves, the government prefers to conflate
them with victims of labor exploitation, drawn from yet another authoritative source
(Fiengold 2010:20).18
Another tool of the master narrative that simultaneously combines emotiveness
with reason and logic is the map. Maps carry explicit discursive authority in
Western culture and provide definitive representation of political and cultural space
(Harley 1988). Maps of human trafficking routes and cases have been published by
NGOs, the US government and international organizations. Maps illustrating human
trafficking usually portray the victim’s countries of origin, the countries that serve
as the corridors through which traffickers move people, and the final destinations
where women are ultimately sold and held in bondage. For example, Fig. 1 shows a
map from the Protection Project created in 2002 that depicts trafficking routes
originating in Russia. The image includes forty-seven black lines each representing
a documented instance of trafficking. The mapping of these routes invokes
Wallerstein’s (1974) world systems model where receiving countries mirror
dominant core states, such as the United States or Western Europe. The periphery
contains both origin and transit countries, and corresponds more or less to the
17 UNESCO has set up a website (http://www.unescobkk.org/index.phpid.=1022) called the Trafficking
Statistics Project to solicit more accurate figures. All of the papers at a 2003 U.N. Crime Commission
conference noted that existing numbers were imprecise, totals ranged widely and there were serious gaps
between known cases and proposed frequencies. For example, of the 50,000 people presumably trafficked
into the United States annually, only 38 cases were actually documented in 1999. In Europe, numbers
projected into the thousands for the Netherlands and Belgium yielded only 200 verifiable cases.




developing world or the former Soviet bloc. In the routes marked on these maps, we
also see an overemphasis on supply and almost no representation of demand. In one
map from the Protection Project, it appears at first glance that the United States is
literally under attack from the women and children of the former Soviet Union and
the developing world (Fig. 2). But this map also conjures up a threat of pollution
and defilement, or humans as matter out of place (Douglas 1969), not necessarily
assaulting the nation, but infecting it by the scourge of trafficking.
The official documentation on human trafficking evidenced through numbers and
maps is further bolstered by the raw emotional power of visual images of both
trafficked women and their callous traffickers in film. Films such as Bought and
Sold, Frontline’s 2005 documentary on global sex trafficking and other documen-
taries of the trafficking problem are vital tools with which anti-trafficking
community defines and disseminates the dominant narrative. Bought and Sold, for
example, combines brief and grainy footage of interviews with trafficked women, in
some cases, matter-of-factly describing their situations with sub-titling akin to what
one would find in police training films.19 For instance, the sub-title ‘‘Evidence’’
flashes on the screen to frame the extent of the problem and the mechanics of
traffickers’ criminal behavior. Frontline’s 2005 documentary likewise provides the
voice of an omniscient narrator, the same voice used in other films on serious topics
Fig. 1 Trafficking of persons, especially women and children: Russia routes. Source: Protection project
19 This film was made in 1997 and was funded by the Open Society Institute, a non-government
organization founded and funded by George Soros.
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such as The Iraq War or Prescription Drugs, to describe suspenseful undercover
footage.20
Selective representations
While maps, data and images convey human trafficking via a comprehensive,
diverse spectrum of discursive technology that is both alarming and convincing, the
master narrative delimits the content of these representations. Thus, it is important
to consider not only the range of information that the dominant discourse contains,
but also what kind of information it leaves out. For example, anti-trafficking
accounts of victims almost always include simple binaristic themes and easily
interpretable symbols of morality and immorality, murky, malevolent characters,
and unsuspecting and ultimately helpless protagonists. Deviations from the ideal or
the prototypical victims of trafficking are rarely depicted in official discourse and
are usually well within an expected range of variation within culture.21 Moreover,
Fig. 2 Trafficking of persons, especially women and children: US routes. Source: Protection project
20 Another documentary using undercover filming focuses on Roma child prostitutes allegedly ‘‘pimped
out’’ by their relatives. The Romanian filmmaker dramatically attempts to ‘‘buy’’ the services of young
boys in the back-alleys of Bucharest, but prior to any actual ‘‘sale’’ the traffickers get spooked and run off
with money.
21 The anti-trafficking community often frames women involved in trafficking as helpless victims while
some critics of anti-trafficking ideologies present the contrasting figure, also incredibly facile, of the
happy hooker and the empowered prostitute. See Weitzer’s (2007) critique of human trafficking
crusaders. Both are problematic representations of individuals involved in sex work.
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these categories discourage complex analyses and complicated understandings of
situational contexts and intersectional identities. Note the following narrative from
the Protection Project:
Nasreen was a Tajik girl who worked in Moscow. Her boss asked her to become
his mistress, promising money, housing, a car and a better life. Nasreen agreed to
this arrangement. One day, a houseguest offered Nasreen the opportunity to work in
Turkey. Nasreen’s boss pressured her to accept the offer. Nasreen was tricked and
trafficked to Israel for forced prostitution. With the help of a sympathetic journalist,
Nasreen was able to escape and return home.
These easy-to-read representations, like number estimates and images, draw on
both emotion and logic and discourage readers from focusing on what is not there.
For example, in most of the narratives of human trafficking victimization, as in
Nasreen’s story above, there are very few concrete details. There is even less
context and almost no background regarding the broader arena in which the terrible
events described in the narrative take place. In another narrative from the 2004 TIP
Report, we learn that Katya from the Czech Republic ‘‘followed the advice of a
‘friend’’’ who told her that ‘‘she could make good money as a waitress (TIP 2004:
PAGE).’’ She ended up in an Amsterdam brothel, and ‘‘after years of threats and
forced prostitution…was rescued by a friendly cab driver’’ (TIP 2004).
These limited stories are oddly similar to what Brunvand (1989) notices in urban
legends or modern-day myths.22 The accounts are rarely longer than one or two
short paragraphs. There are few details of place, time and general social milieu.
Beyond the basic mechanics of the abduction, there is only a vague mention of the
location of origin and final destination. Also, usually included but vague and
unspecified is a supportive NGO. In a similarly brief and undetailed narrative from
the 2009 TIP Report, an NGO is critical to the story but not identified or explained:
Azade, 22, left rural Azerbaijan to work at a massage parlor in Baku. But the
massage parlor was a cover for a brothel. Soon after she arrived, a client who
worked for the brothel owner forced himself on Azade and threatened to show a
videotape of the assault to her father unless she engaged in prostitution at the
brothel. Fearing the social stigma attached to rape and the consequences of bringing
shame to her family, Azade submitted to several months of forced prostitution
before she escaped with the help of an anti- trafficking NGO. (TIP 2009: Emphasis
added).
Discourse analysts recognize how language is not a transparent rendering of life
as it happens but rather constitutive of social reality in which we find ourselves.
Narrative analysts (Norrick 2000; Trinch 2003) show how stories are used to do
something. In other words, there is often a pragmatic purpose to storytelling. The
US State Department explains at the beginning of the TIP Report’s victim narrative
sections that ‘‘victims’ testimonies…illustrate the many forms of trafficking and the
22 Montgomery (2011) has noted the role of rumor in reports of child trafficking cases following natural
disasters in Asia, the Pacific and the Caribbean. A similar concern has been raised by Campion Vincent
(2001) about the role of rumor in the problem of organ theft and trafficking. She argues that in Scheper-
Hughes (2001a) with organ trafficking in Brazil her data conflate ethnographic stories of organ stealing
and actual cases of organ selling. Nevertheless, Scheper Hughes is willing to consider both legends and
reports as a set of practices (Scheper-Hughes 2001b).
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wide variety of places in which trafficking occurs’’ (TIP 2008:4).23 While it is
understandable that victim identities would be disguised and that actual locations
would be obscured in order to protect people who have been exploited and who may
continue to experience danger, threats and intimidation, there is at the same time
almost no cultural or contextual information that distinguishes the abuse or gives a
sense of the experience of exploitation, subjugation or survival. Instead, we find
only the abuse or violence perpetrated against them, and then quite abruptly it stops
at ‘‘moments of rescue’’ or when ‘‘prosecutions are made.’’ There is in fact very
little that is ‘‘human’’ in official narratives of human trafficking, which amount to
‘‘thin description.’’24 Moreover, a curious feature of the victim narratives is that
they are not ‘‘told by’’ victims themselves. Rather, the accounts that circulate that
‘‘establish’’ the crime are told by others. And these tellings are not legal testimony
or testimonials told in the first person by the victim–eyewitness (see for example
Beverly 1993:97, Trinch 2010). All the TIP victim narratives are written in the third
person and begin with the victim’s name, as opposed to in the first person when a
woman would introduce herself as a person victimized: ‘‘My name is Rigoberta
Menchu…’’ (Menchu 2010:1). Aside from the sentences that introduce the account,
there is no mention of how accounts were elicited or who initiated the telling
(Trinch 2003, 2010). Media accounts of victim’s stories also tend to rely not on
victim narratives, but information from second-hand sources. In a survey of press
coverage on trafficking, Gulati notes that very little, if any, of the information
reported comes from victims or from traffickers themselves (Gulati n.d.:16–17).25
Similarly, in Junger’s iconic story (Junger 2002:165–166), as well as Jonathan
Landesman’s New York Times expose on the trafficking scourge in the United States
(Landesman 2004:36), it is notable that for much of these reports, both the
journalists and the experts are the ones who mainly speak on behalf of victims.
One could ask then not what one misses from a lack of details, but rather what
one discursively gains from it. In this case, it seems that official trafficking
narratives are not really meant to show anything else but the fact that victims can be
and want to be saved. These narratives are not created as records to define
trafficking or even to witness it. And they are definitely not created to show the
complexity, diversity or variety of human trafficking that exists. These victim
narratives are created to be taken up as a call for intervention. Arguably, by
entextualizing these narratives within the official, NGO- or government-sponsored
training materials, they gain a particular formal status and authority and their
structure becomes naturalized as a ‘‘standard’’ story of human trafficking (cf. Trinch
2003), imbuing the government-sponsored training with an authority it might
otherwise not have. They become official tools of authoritative discourse and of
information dissemination on a global scale. For instance, a curriculum for human
23 This statement explaining the inclusion of ‘‘victim narratives’’ first appears in the 2008 TIP Report and
in all subsequent reports.
24 I borrow this term from Robert Hayden (2008) who coined it in a response to Dawson (2008).
25 According to Gulati (n.d.), most stories on human trafficking between 2000 and 2005 rely on
government or official sources or on sources from organizations receiving government support (43 %
from government, 23 % from law enforcement agencies and 19 % from NGOs combatting trafficking or
providing services to victims).
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trafficking training developed and published by the GAATW includes the same type
of third-person narrative that is devoid of much of the humanizing details that are
common elements of narratives of violence and exploitation, but instead trafficking
narratives always frame the victim as innocent, and the trafficker as ‘‘evil’’ in facile
ways.26
The master narrative unbound: self-fulfilling retellings
If the concept of uptake can help to explain the curious limitations and legend-like
structures of victim stories in TIP reports, it may also be useful to consider how
media and other conveyors of communication have appropriated and adopted the
dominant discourse beyond the scope of official accounts, in other words, how these
technologies come to be part of what Warner (2005) calls ‘‘the public.’’ In the news
and in popular culture, we see that the master narrative gets told and retold by other
interlocutors. How it gets retold and by whom has implications for its dissemination,
appearance and utility. For instance, in terms of media, Gulati (no date) argues that
while print media coverage of human trafficking has increased as the efforts of
government and NGOs have stepped up, what gets reported has really been mostly a
reflection of the ‘‘official’’ perspective. Gulati has found that newspaper and
magazine journalists ‘‘have done a poor job of representing the various viewpoints
on the issue’’ (Gulati p. 22), a situation which he blames on the culture of journalism
where reporters simply rely on a canon of the presumably credible sources and on
the general difficulty of reporting on underground behavior. For example,
Landesman’s (2004) New York Times Magazine feature on the trafficking scourge
in North America quotes outdated estimates of 50,000 victims in the United States
each year.27 Even in cases of non-mainstream print journalism, the persistence of
older versions of the master discourse is surprising. For example, responding to a
reader’s question about White Slavery in 1999, Straight Dope columnist,
professional myth buster and proponent of factual accuracy Cecil Adams echoed
Doezema’s critical and informed analysis about past moral panics in his syndicated
column in the Chicago Reader, but then included an update in 2002 from a reader
who noted that:
26 The narrative reads: ‘‘Delia, from a small village in Southern Romania, was offered a short-term
contract for a job in a flower shop in Germany by a friend, Matache. Matache promised to organize
everything: passports, visas, and employment contract. Delia would earn 100 Deutsche marks per day,
and be free to come home whenever she wanted. However, when they arrived in Germany, Matache gave
her passport to a man who met them in exchange for some money. Delia realized what was happening, but
when she tried to move away a gun was pulled on her. She was taken to a house and locked inside. When
Delia tried to resist, she was raped and beaten by two men. For some time, they forced Delia to have sex
with several men per day, and forced her to use drugs. There were other women working in the house but
they were not allowed to communicate with each other. All the women were forced to take contraceptive
pills, and anyone who got pregnant was forced to have an abortion (Handbook 1999, GAATW:10).
27 A report on trafficking in Florida published and circulated in 2005 by the FSU Center for the
Advancement of Human Rights also cites the 50,000 estimate even though officials had dropped the
estimated number of trafficked persons into the United States as 17,000.
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While…‘‘white slavery’’ may not have been a big deal in the 19th century for
young European women and girls, the problem of human trafficking is an
unfortunate 20th century reality… [and] is one of the fastest growing areas of
international criminal activity and one that is of increasing concern to the U.S.
Administration, Congress and the international community (Adams 2002).
The reader includes an outdated official estimate of 1–2 million annual victims
and provides Adams with URL links to the US State Department. Adams then
innocently replies: ‘‘I knew about slavery in Asia but frankly wasn’t aware of how
widespread the problem was. Thanks for bringing us up to date’’ (Adams 2002). At
the same time, print media formats can recast complex information in order to
conform to the simple messages of the grand discourse. For instance, Donna
Hughes, a professor at the University of Rhode Island, reported in 2006 on the
growing problem of prostitution in Iran, a country currently at the rank of Tier 3 in
the TIP Report. While her article covers a range of issues from street hookers to
domestic abuse, the piece is framed by the headline ‘‘Iran’s Sex Slaves Suffer
Hideously under Mullahs’’ and thus the obfuscating message of an over-simplified
equation that Islamic leadership results in female slavery.
In contrast to print journalism, television and documentary films on human
trafficking have aggressively tried to capture the ‘‘underground experience’’ and to
find the emotional story of a victim’s experience. But, like the narratives in the TIP
Reports, one sees attempts to portray iconic victim stories, long on dramatic tension
and short on contextual detail. Moreover, in television expose’s such as CBS’ Peter
Van Sant rescuing sex slaves in Romania (2009), or NBC’s Chris Hanson saving
child prostitutes in Cambodia (2005), the story is about the heroic journalist
responding to the horror of the crime up close, but rarely does one see traffickers or
speak with police about the difficulties evident in responding to the crime. Even the
representation of victims in documentary film has become means to maintain
interest in combatting the crime, a sort of self-fulfilling representation to attract
donors and public support. Lindquist (2010) argues that Indonesian NGOs ‘‘are
dependent on the enduring public interest in trafficking’’ and ‘‘the testimonial of the
victim becomes a necessity in the formation of an aesthetic of trafficking (Lindquist
2010:233).’’ This ‘‘audit culture’’ of the image of the victim, according to Lindquist,
is a sort of self-fulfilling enterprise, which actually encourages the production of the
documentary medium and thus of one form of the master narrative itself.
In addition to being ‘‘taken up’’ by mainstream media (Farrell and Fahy 2009),
the master narrative has also entered the realm of pop culture, where it continues to
be reproduced and reinterpreted in new but authoritative ways. For example, several
episodes of the television cop drama Law and Order have incorporated human
trafficking as a main plot device. The feature film Taken, produced in 2008, centers
on the kidnapping and selling into sexual slavery of the protagonist’s daughter while
on a trip to Paris, has spawned a 2012 sequel, Taken 2.28 While these fictional
accounts take liberties with official accounts, recently published novels about sexual
28 Taken grossed $226,830,000 worldwide according to boxofficemojo.com. The Whistleblower, a film
released in 2010 dealing with human trafficking in Bosnia, a subject that is discussed later in this article,
and which is based on true events, grossed $1,124,000 according to the same source.
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slavery dedicate the inspiration for the work to real-life (but un-named) victims of
trafficking and make explicit reference to government sources in order to educate
their readers about facts (Hodge 2011; Nelson 2011).29
The dominant trafficking discourse is not just retold in media and popular culture,
but also recast back into the sphere of official government policy agendas such as
border security and the US’s relationship with so-called rogue states. For example,
in a 2004 Florida speech on human trafficking, George Bush accused the Castro
regime of supporting child sex trafficking and sex tourism. To support his claim,
Bush cited a two-page report published by the Protection Project, the Johns Hopkins
anti-trafficking NGO. Yet neither of the two sources included in this report
explicitly identified a single reported case of trafficking in Cuba. In fact, the
Protection Project’s report only suggested the possibility that sex tourism, not sex
trafficking, in Cuba might be ‘‘on the rise.’’ Regardless of the controversial issues
involved in comparing sex trafficking with sex tourism, Bush accomplished the dual
aims of promoting the issue of human trafficking and reinforcing the US isolation
and vilification of Castro’s Cuba, maligning both the dictator and the country
through its alleged association with the exploitation of women and children.30
Interestingly, there is not one documented case of trafficking originating from,
passing through or ending up in Cuba.31 If we return to the Protection Project’s map,
we see verified cases coming from the Dominican Republic (a Tier 2 country), but
not one line links Cuba.32
It is no surprise, then, to find that the US government rates Cuba’s status as a
non-compliant Tier 3 country in the various versions of the TIP Report. Other Tier 3
countries in the 2004 report include Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Sudan, North
Korea, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Venezuela. These states are mostly countries and
governments with which the United States has ideological conflicts that go far
29 Sibel Hodge, for example, author of ‘‘Trafficked: The Diary of a Sex Slave’’ writes ‘‘I normally write
chick lit books… About five years ago I watched a mini-series about girls from Eastern Europe who’d
been trafficked. It haunted me for a long time…. Then a little while ago I was sitting in a doctor’s surgery
waiting for an appointment and picked up a magazine. Inside was a story about one woman who had been
trafficked. It made a chill run through me, and I realized that in those five years, I’d never heard anything
in the media about it. That got me thinking, and I started researching other victim’s stories online. They
were horrific… In 2007 the US Department of State carried out a Trafficking in Persons report. The
statistics shocked me to the core:700,000–800,000 men, women and children trafficked across
international borders each year, approximately 80 % of which are women and girls, and up to 50 %
are minors. The figures will be a lot higher four years on…’’ (Hodge 2011:iii).
30 See Montgomery (2001) for a case study on the ethnographic realities of sex tourism in Thailand.
31 The 2001 TIP Report notes ‘‘isolated cases of trafficking [into Costa Rica] have involved persons from
Africa … Cuba … and the Middle East’’ (TIP 2001:38). No details are given. The 2003 TIP report does
not even include Cuba in its country rankings although it describes Cuba in its country report as a place
for sex tourism, agricultural labor and construction work (the latter linked to political dissidence). TIP
2004–2010 lists Cuba as a Tier 3 country but the 2006 TIP Report states that ‘‘the nature and extent of
trafficking in the country is hard to gauge due to the closed nature of the government and a lack of non-
governmental reporting’’ (TIP 2006:102). TIP 2011 adds that trafficking in Cuba is ’’particularly difficult
to gauge‘‘.
32 Also not reported in Bush’s speech was the Protection Project’s report’s finding that American’s
started the sex tourist business in Cuba in the 1950s. The report also noted that the current users of the sex
tourist industry in Cuba are American and Canadians, which Bush did mention, but instead placed
Canadians first in his remarks.
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beyond the exploitation of women and children. Perhaps realizing the political
ideology behind the TIP rankings, organizations such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International have criticized these rankings, arguing, for example, that,
based on actual known cases of trafficking, countries such as Macedonia, which
enjoy Tier 1 status, should really be placed in Tier 3. Nevertheless, whether it serves
to shame developed countries to meet US demands to reform legal codes (Warren
2010) or as additional fodder for applying discursive pressure to rogue states, the
ranking system endures as a fundamental part of the master narrative.
In the two ethnographic cases that follow, I examine how the master narrative
fails to take up important details about local situations of human trafficking in its
own discourse and disregards local perspectives on human trafficking that run
counter to conventional anti-trafficking views. In the first case, from Bosnia, which
has arguably moved beyond the US-led faith-based and feminist ‘‘rescue industry’’
paradigm characterized by critics as dominating the landscape of international
intervention (Agustin 2007, Bernstein 2010) one finds a story of compliance and
success but also a case of simplified representations that ultimately disregards the
role of the United States in contributing to the problem. In the second case, from
Kazakhstan, the picture is more one-sided and even somewhat confrontational on
the part of local-level responses to the anti-trafficking narrative.
Bosnia: aftermath of a perfect storm
The Bosnian police captain leaned toward me, shoulders squared and arms folded as
he recounted his work in Tuzla Canton. ‘‘We had a case where some Americans
were involved with a girl from a nightclub and when the military police began their
investigation these individuals were immediately repatriated to their country’’ he
said, with his brows furrowed. He went on, leaning backwards in his chair ‘‘The
IPTF [International Police Task Force] had a rotation every 6 months. So all of
them moved and we never got any feedback. We also couldn’t accuse or bring to
trial any of these local people because we did not have witnesses from the
Americans.’’ The officer was referring to the specific context of the post-war
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina which witnessed the trafficking of hundreds of
women from the former Soviet Union for the purposes of sexual exploitation
(Limanowska 2002). Bosnia, in effect, amounted to a ‘‘perfect storm’’ of porous
borders, a dysfunctional criminal justice system, several neighboring states such as
Moldova and Ukraine with emaciated economies, a population of international
peacekeeping forces, including international law enforcement, and, most impor-
tantly, a relatively large contingent of private civilian contractors.33 Unlike regular
military in SFOR, these Americans lived among local civilians and led unmonitored
private lives without the same kind of oversight as SFOR personnel and had money
and resources. One American contractor reportedly told a colleague that they
considered Bosnia to be an ‘‘adult playground’’ (Mendelson 2005:35).
33 Between 1995 and 2003, 28,000 US soldiers and American private contractors had been stationed in
Bosnia (AE 2003:24). The total amount of US personnel in Bosnia declined steadily after 1998 and
amounted to around 2,500 by 2003.
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The link between the proliferation of sites of prostitution and black markets and the
presence of international peacekeepers is well-known (Andreas 2008). In Bosnia, the
troubling link between the specific type of peacekeeping and reconstruction
environment and the proliferation of human trafficking was initially uncovered by
Martina Vandenberg, a lawyer working for Human Rights Watch. In her report to
Human Rights Watch, Vandenberg found that not only were local police and other
officials involved with human trafficking, but members of the International Police
Force (IPTF), including Americans, were frequently identified as clients of traffickers
and who purchased women in bondage.34 More troubling was the instances in which
employees of the US contractor DynCorp allegedly purchased women as sex slaves.
Vandenberg learned that these private contractors and international law enforcement
agents operated with impunity, and once accused of wrong-doing, were quickly
repatriated to their home country or transferred to other sites in the Balkans. One police
officer from Zivinice outside of Tuzla complained that these foreign individuals
presented the ‘‘biggest problem for us. We can’t do anything against them—they are
above the law’’ (Vandenberg 2002:64). In a 2005 report commissioned by the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Sarah Mendelson investigated the specific
conditions encouraging the complicity of a system of peacekeepers with respect to the
exploitation of women in the Balkans, including Bosnia and, more recently, Kosovo.
For instance, she found that US military leadership in many cases tolerated prostitution
services provided to troops and that some of these patrons were aware of the exploited
status of the women involved (Mendelson 2005:33). Both Vandenberg’s and
Mendelson’s research are examples of the important complexities of the links
between post-conflict zones and human trafficking for sexual exploitation.
My own visit to Bosnia in 2006 with Jacqueline Berman and Vandenberg to
investigate the aftermath of this confluence of conflict, neglect and complacency not
only confirmed the correlation of the presence of peacekeepers and the problem of
trafficking but also reiterated evidence that the situation had substantially changed.
But how it had changed was a matter of debate. For example, it was clear from
interviews with police in Sarajevo and in Tuzla that human trafficking had been
both a ‘‘real’’ problem and a ‘‘serious’’ one. But it was equally clear from speaking
with law enforcement officials and some staffers from international organizations
that trafficking was a crisis that had passed. For instance, the deputy police
commissioner in Tuzla told me that after the war ended in 1995, there was a
significant problem with trafficking around the town, but that since 2003, there had
been no cases reported. In between that, time was a coordinated effort to shut down
a string of brothels lining the roads on the outskirts of Tuzla near Eagle Base and in
other districts such as Zivinice.35 Local police observed that in place of human
34 One case in particular, known as the Prijedor case, involved dozens of women claiming to be victims
of trafficking and allegedly directly exploited by IPTF officers (Vandenberg 2002:49).
35 On 2 March, local police in seven cities in the MND(N) Area of Operations (AO) participated in a
nationwide crackdown on human trafficking as they raided brothels and detained those suspected of
engaging in this activity. Although ‘‘International Police Task Force (IPTF) assets were made available to
them, the local police were responsible for conducting this significant, coordinated police action.
Designated MND(N) personnel and facilities were prepared to provide temporary support for the women
but the need for lodging and care at these locations proved to be unnecessary’’ (AE 2003:53).
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trafficking, there were serious problems with resettlement, theft of property and
illegal drug trafficking.
Speaking with police and NGOs also revealed widely divergent stories about the
present. While the police kept insisting that the crisis of human trafficking was over
in Bosnia, NGOs suggested that trafficking was going underground, moving out of
the brothel and dance club and into the labyrinth of private homes in nearby
towns.36 When I reported this theory to the Tuzla police officers, one captain
responded wryly that ‘‘they [NGOs] would not exist without the problem.’’ His
reply echoed the conundrum of trying to confirm a hidden crime about which
Weitzer (2012) and other critics of the anti-trafficking community have complained
(Fiengold 2010, Warren 2010). Additionally, Limanowska reports for Bosnia that in
‘‘many cases it is not possible to find out whether women being assisted by NGOs
are cases of trafficking, violence against women, forced prostitution or exploitation
of prostitution more generally’’ (Limanowska 2007:77). Wedel (2001) has noted the
lop-sided relationship between non-governmental organizations in Eastern Europe
whereby foreign donor governments and organizations drive the issues and
essentially set the standards and back up these themes with funding. In fact, she
noted that a study of NGOs receiving foreign funding in the region ‘‘found that
‘local groups proliferated… around issues that Western donors found important, but
rarely around issues that locals confronted on a daily basis’’’ (Wedel 2001).37 To
complicate even further Bosnia’s case of what Berman (2008) describes as post-
conflict conflict, two staffers from an international NGO revealed to me that despite
what local police think about women’s groups chasing money, the lion’s share of
the resources to combat human trafficking was mostly controlled by only one
organization, the International Office of Migration. They also noted that IOM
received most of its counter-trafficking resources from the US government via
USAID. Since funds came through IOM, they argued, local NGOs had little if any
input into how the problem could be handled or how victims could be assisted
(Berman 2008).
Since 2010, Bosnia has been ranked by the United States at Tier One. Yet
looking at how the official story of Bosnia has been ‘‘taken up’’ by the United States
reveals interesting discrepancies that perhaps only a close reading can yield. For
example, following Vandenberg’s 2002 report, the 2003 TIP country narrative for
Bosnia states: ‘‘although the presence of international civilian and military
personnel has contributed to the trafficking problem in BiH, the local population
actively sustains it’’ (TIP 2003:36). Despite Vandenberg’s data on private
contractors, the TIP Report defines the problem as being a local one, not an
outcome exacerbated by international relationships between assistance and
mismanagement. Moreover, no mention is made of the type of ‘‘internationals’’
contributing to the trafficking industry (TIP 2003:36). The only other mention of
peacekeepers in the 2003 TIP Report comes from brief passages about Sierra Leone
and East Timor (TIP 2003:251). The 2004 report mentions a UN position paper
36 Mendelson (2005) and Dawson (2008) also report this shift to underground trafficking, but provide
little evidence of this assertion.
37 Quoted from Sarah E. Mendelson and John K.Glenn 2000:19).
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setting a new code of conduct for peacekeepers (TIP 2004:12).38 The 2005 report
included information on soldiers and sexual exploitation, noting training efforts on
the part of the Department of Defense, which initiated a zero tolerance policy
toward trafficking. On my visit to Bosnia, it was never clear what type of anti-
trafficking training soldiers were receiving nor were there materials available to
examine other than the TIP report handed to me at the gate at Eagle Base. Following
Mendelson’s report on the Balkans, the 2006 TIP report included very basic action
plans sketched out for NATO and OSCE, and by 2009, almost all country reports
contained a concluding line about the implementation of ‘‘peacekeeping training’’
but with absolutely no details as to who was being trained, how many, or with what
materials. Finally, while Bosnia appeared to fit perfectly into the master narrative
according to various TIP reports, moving from struggling post-war chaos and
lawlessness at Tier Three to legal discipline and NGO-run victim assistance at Tier
One, there is no record of the shameful role of some US peacekeepers in the official
TIP account.
Kazakhstan: a non-compliant state
The Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan could not be further from Bosnia in
terms of its position within the international community, its political trajectory
following the collapse of communism and its experience with the problem of human
trafficking. Wedged between Russia and China and in the vicinity of war-torn
Afghanistan to its south, including Afghanistan, Kazakhstan has been politically
stable under the leadership of Nazarbayev since its independence in 1991. Its ethnic
diversity has not resulted in armed conflict (Schatz 2004), and its economy has been
bolstered by an abundance of natural resources including the crucial Tengiz oil
fields in its western region (Kramer 2010).
My work with the anti-trafficking movement in Kazakhstan originally occurred
as part of a US State Department funded development project aimed at providing
training for law enforcement on domestic violence. In 1999, the Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) had awarded Florida
State University a two-year grant to work with local stakeholders to create,
implement and evaluate a domestic violence training curriculum for police,
prosecutors and judges.39 In 2001, when my colleague Dmitriy Vyortkin and I were
awarded two additional years of funding, we were encouraged by INL staff to
incorporate a human trafficking component into our training of police on gender and
domestic violence. From the perspective of the State Department, Kazakhstan was
an appropriate site for conducting an anti-trafficking training project: it was deemed
a source, transit and receiving country. Moreover, it ranked Kazakhstan at Tier
Three, along with states like Cuba and North Korea, in both the 2001 and 2002 TIP
38 This report also only mentions Morocco and East Timor as problem areas in which peacekeepers were
clients of brothels where trafficked women were suspected.
39 The project trained dozens of officers, prosecutors and judges in several oblasts across the country
(Snajdr and Vyortkin 2001).
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Reports. In March 2003, Vyortkin and I held a three-day workshop in Almaty that
included Kazakhstani border police, city police, National Security Agency officers,
and judges and prosecutors. To lead our effort, we invited a Florida State Prosecutor
who had experience managing and training legal professionals to collaborate with
women’s NGOs who specialized in gender violence and women’s rights, including
the Feminist League, the Crisis Center Network and the Women’s Information
Center, an advocacy group for women in need of legal assistance. Our workshop
also included the local coordinator from the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), the main international NGO working on trafficking in Kazakh-
stan, a liaison from the American Bar Association-Central East European Law
Initiative (ABA-CEELI), a US organization helping with legal reforms in post-
socialist states and a staff member of the US Embassy in Almaty.
As we expected, the workshop showed us local perspectives on human trafficking
in Kazakhstan, but it also uncovered how these views and experiences intersected
with or significantly departed from the dominant discourse on the problem. As is
common in the former Soviet Union, meetings and seminars usually began with
formal introductions and lengthy speeches given by the superiors of key participants
who eat up time only to disappear when the substantive work begins. In our
workshop, however, many of these upper-level administrators stayed to participant
in the group’s attempts to define the problem of human trafficking in Kazakhstan.
Here, local women’s NGOs took the lead, referring to the UN Protocol on Human
Trafficking and introducing material from international women’s groups. But when
Katarina, the local coordinator of IOM, announced that her organization estimated
that over 5,000 people were trafficked out of Kazakhstan each year, police and
prosecutors were at first stunned, and then curious. They asked her IOM came by
this figure. She then admitted that there had only been 53 documented cases of
trafficking in 2001, but explained that IOM calculates the estimate as a multiple of
what actually gets reported. One officer then remarked that 53 cases seemed small
when compared to other crime problems plaguing the country.40
In addition to confusion about estimates and actual cases, participants found it
difficult to isolate the problem from the complicating aspects of Kazakhstan’s post-
socialist economic and political transition. A Border Patrol captain announced that
his department had been watching several travel agencies in Almaty which they
suspected of trapping women into situations of forced prostitution abroad. He
admitted, however, that other border problems, such as illegal drugs, were given
priority in his office. Moreover, his unit still had no evidence that these businesses
operated as international organized crime networks nor did it have adequate
resources to thoroughly investigate these companies.41 Besides, he added, ‘‘if they
have all the documents then there is little chance that we can stop them’’ and he
surmised that traffickers would need false documents only if they were to take
40 The UN Crime Commission notes that over estimating is a general problem in assessing the scope of
human trafficking. For example, annual estimates for the Netherlands is 1,000–3,000 but only 289 cases
were documented for 1999. Similarly, Belgium’s figures were estimated at 1,000–3,000 with only 270
documented cases (Makkai 2003).
41 Zhang and Chin (2002) note that organized networks are not the mechanism of human smuggling in
China. See also Schloenhardt (1999).
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under-aged women out of the country. Our US prosecutor concurred, casually
observing that one could easily access counterfeit documents over the Internet. On
hearing this, another officer laughed, noting that most Kazakh police units did not
even have computers. Perhaps embarrassed at his colleague’s admission of a lack of
resources, another officer said ‘‘Look law enforcement in the post-Soviet period is
working. People still shout ‘help, police!’’’ But, he suggested, low pay and outdated
training certainly undermined the effectiveness of police work. He then challenged
the US trainer with the question: ‘‘How much do you make in America as a
prosecutor?’’
Elaborating on this theme of a struggling society, another officer complained that
official newspapers did report anything on trafficking but that she had read a tabloid
news story claiming that the most popular response to a survey of career aspirations
among female teens in Northern Kazakhstan was ‘‘to become a hard currency
prostitute.’’ Another officer asked ‘‘How can you stop a woman from leaving a poor
village to work the streets of Almaty?’’ One Kazakh prosecutor then concluded that
‘‘if a woman wants to do it, to travel abroad, it is difficult to call this exploitation.
We call these people ‘adventurers.’’’ NGO activists quickly challenged this theory
as victim blaming and argued that traffickers were taking advantage of desperate
youth. Nazpary (2001) describes this disturbing moral resignation exhibited by
some workshop participants as a function of the dislocation and chaos of
Kazakhstan’s new but brutal market economy which has created a kind of post-
socialist normalization of desperation.42 At the same time, how participants view
vulnerability and thus construct a particular kind of moral exclusion (Opotow 1990)
in this case may be exacerbated by ethnicity. Demographers and anthropologists
studying migration have characterized post-Soviet out-migration as the result of the
‘‘push’’ factors of poor economic prospects which force people to seek work abroad
(Craumer 1992; Korobkov and Zaionchkovsaia 2004), including in particular young
women (Bloch 2003). The push of desperation is complemented by the ‘‘pull’’ of
what are perceived to be more prosperous opportunities in Western countries
(Hierman 2004). In Kazakhstan, the attractiveness of these pull factors have also
depended significantly on one’s ethnic identity. Thirty-seven percent of Kazakh-
stan’s population is ethnic Russian. Though ethnic tensions between Russians and
Kazakhs have not been violent, between the years 1994 and 2006, some 3 million
Russians had left the country. In interviews I conducted with young Russians, many
felt they had little or no job prospects and believed that ethnic Kazakhs and other
Central Asians were being privileged over ethnic Russians in the new economy.
Likewise, we learned from speaking to police that a majority of prostitutes in
Almaty and other towns in Kazakhstan were ethnic Russians.
In addition to revealing a somewhat callous ethnovictimology, the workshop
inspired open criticism of the actions of international NGOs in the country and the
pressure to conform to a US version of ‘‘rule of law’’ in Kazakhstan’s transition
from socialism. For instance, officers also complained that IOM staffers drive
around Almaty in their giant SUVs, looking no different from the new mafiya
42 See also Shelley (1994) on the perception of change in crime frequency following the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
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menacing post-Soviet society. Most people, including police, drive old Russian-
made Ladas or Trabants. Some police units cram as many as four or five passengers
in a patrol car in order to get to a crime scene or a police incident. One frustrated
judge then asked ‘‘What about receiving countries? How is this possible that so
many women end up in these foreign cities?’’ Another asked ‘‘How are we to punish
them—even if we change our laws—if women end up outside of Kazakhstan?’’ A
prosecutor then suggested the laws in receiving countries like the United States and
in Western Europe were passive. A third judge criticized the United States for
demanding changes in the law of a sovereign state and challenged the credibility of
our US consultant by asking how many cases of trafficking she had actually
prosecuted.43
These questions certainly revealed the difficult position of states that were not on
the receiving end of the trafficking phenomenon to define the problem of trafficking
and to respond to it in terms of adjustments to the criminal justice system. They also
revealed that our Kazakhstani stakeholders were not so much telling us about the
problem of human trafficking in Kazakhstan, as they were being introduced to the
version of human trafficking represented by the master narrative. Indeed the US
prosecutor’s training materials at our American-funded workshop were developed in
1999 by the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women, the international anti-
trafficking NGO. Likewise, the Crisis Center Network, as part of its ‘‘expertise’’ on
human trafficking screened the film Bought and Sold, which the group’s director had
received from the international organization La Strada while attending a trafficking
conference in Kiev.44
Nevertheless, the participants agreed to create a pamphlet for high school
students regarding human trafficking and its dangers.45 As a measure to respond to
trafficking, it certainly seemed to address ‘‘prevention,’’ one of the three P’s touted
by the State Department as a critical response to human trafficking and outlined in
the workshop by our US prosecutor.46 In terms of ‘‘protection’’ and ‘‘prosecution,’’
these areas proved more difficult, but participants suggested that women’s groups
could provide shelter for victims and that Article 128 of the Kazakhstani criminal
code could be used to prosecute trafficker. Additionally, an anti-trafficking bill was
under debate in the majilis, Kazakhstan’s parliament, and participants agreed to
lobby for its passage.
We also learned that around the time of our Almaty workshop, Kazakhstan was
being evaluated for the 2003 TIP Report, due out later that summer. The US
43 She replied that she had not prosecuted any cases. She replied ’’None, I am actually a trainer in the
U.S. and I manage the prosecutor’s office.
44 La Strada’s Warsaw office was established in 1995 as ‘‘La Strada Program: Prevention of Traffic in
Women in Central and Eastern Europe’’, under the supervision of Stichting tegen Vrouwenhandel (Dutch
Foundation against Traffic in Women, STV). Eight years later, this program expanded to a network of 9
independent but coordinated groups in Poland, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Bulgaria,
Belarussia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Moldova.
45 In addition to the pamphlet project, the workshop also brought down interagency barriers, introduced
law enforcement to the work of NGOs and educated women’s activists about the bureaucratic and
legalistic constraints of policing (see Snajdr 2006).
46 While participants looked to the US consultant for guidance, she admitted that she was not aware of a
US pamphlet that supported public awareness on human trafficking.
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Embassy staff in Kazakhstan would be submitting the information for this report. It
was therefore encouraging to all of those involved in the workshop that a US
Embassy representative attended the program.47 Ironically though, the embassy
representative told our team that the State Department had just announced that no
funding would be available for trafficking in Kazakhstan for 2004. Even more
surprising and puzzling, however, was how the 2003 TIP Report ranked
Kazakhstan. Though no funds were being made available to assist the country,
Kazakhstan was demoted Tier 2 to Tier 3 and tersely described as ‘‘limited by lack
of resources, police corruption and difficulty monitoring its borders’’ (TIP 2003).
That May, the majilis approved additions to the country’s criminal code specifying
punishments for human trafficking and Kazakhstan’s president signed the bill into
law in July (Interfax Kazakhstan). In September 2003, Presidential Determination
No. 35 upgraded Kazakhstan to the rank of Tier 2. But while action by the Bush
administration upgraded Kazakhstan to Tier 2, the Master Narrative, written on the
State Department’s website, continued to represent Kazakhstan as a Tier 3 country.
Kazakhstan remained de facto at this lowest rank for almost a year, until the 2004
TIP Report, when it was placed in yet a new category, on a special Watch List,
below Tier 2. Upon learning this, the anthropologist in me was impressed at how the
master narrative re-asserted itself and exercised new forms of authority with a
uniquely liminal category like a ‘‘watch list.’’ Victor Turner (1967) has shown how
liminal states of being infuse rituals with their power to mark transformation.
Liminality is inherently dangerous because of its ‘‘in-betweenness,’’ a condition of
‘‘nowhereness.’’ Here, the anti-trafficking master narrative inverts this condition,
utilizing the liminal category as a holding pattern, and as an assertion of domination.
Over the decade that the TIP report has been issued, Kazakhstan has moved back
and forth from Watch List to Tier Two in a perpetual state of non-compliance. Over
the same decade, the United States has sought airbases on Kazakhstani territory to
augment access to Afghanistan and was rebuffed by Nazarbayev and has negotiated
for specific pipeline routes through Turkey for better access to Kazakhstan’s Tengiz
oil production.
Conclusion
The US counter-trafficking narrative intersects with a host of emerging arrange-
ments of capital, migration and geopolitical relationships in flux at the end of the
twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century. Research from Bosnia and
ethnographic data from Kazakhstan provide more complex views of the local
manifestations of what is being called global human trafficking. In Bosnia, one sees
the aftermath of a serious and troubling development in which women were sexually
exploited and a structure of foreign aid and stabilization strategies that supported, in
very specific ways, this exploitation. In Kazakhstan, the elements of desperation that
47 We also learned that at the time of the workshop, an additional assessment of the issue was being
conducted in the entire Central Asian region by an official from the US Justice Department. Her
assessment concluded that, in Kazakhstan and in other Central Asian states, there did not appear to be a
trafficking problem to the degree and scope of other regions of the world.
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drive victims to exploitation, albeit on a significantly smaller scale, have ethnic
overtones and have emerged alongside other perhaps more pressing crime problems.
Moreover, Kazakhstan itself remains neutral presence in terms of the region’s main
powers of Russia and China.
While trafficking in persons is hardly a myth, the official narrative put out by its
US and international stakeholders is, arguably, the stuff of legend.48 Brunvand
(1989) reminds us that urban legends play on societal and cultural fears and
anxieties. He argues that like myths, these legends circulate as moral lessons, told
from person to person using themes and images of plausible, but personally
unimaginable situations.49 With its accounts of personal suffering linked with
simplistic country rankings, the US government and anti-trafficking advocacy
groups perhaps promote a global legend, making victims iconic while keeping states
liminal. Such rankings depict countries as disorderly and corrupt, suggesting that the
victimization of trafficking in humans results from these uncivilized states, and like
the myths of any religious tradition allow those that rank to present themselves as
the remedy to the problem.
Susan Ehrlich (2010) has argued that we perhaps need overarching master
narratives precisely to elicit ‘‘uptake’’ by the law enforcement community, a justice
system, or by society at large. Drawing on Brison (2003) work, Ehrlich notes that
especially considering certain gender crimes, such a rape or domestic violence, one
of the problems missing from the public’s conceptualization of the severity of the
issue is the fact that there exists no common articulation of outrage. For example,
the holocaust and other genocides offer a historical framework of shared experience
or a cultural metric with which to measure a crisis of common identity or of the
public good. In this sense, master narratives, like that produced by the anti-
trafficking movement, can function to ‘‘tell a story’’—to link the individual with the
larger immediacy of the collective. No doubt, as such a narrative develops and as
the problem is named and defined, there is the conundrum of limiting what belongs
or what an experience or a trauma should be called. Through definitions one also
finds the conundrum of oppression. The additional danger in telling ‘‘the story’’ or in
defining the problem so that it achieves ‘‘uptake,’’ is that there is precious little room
for revision, a situation that Errol Morris (2012) has called ‘‘the prison of …
narrative.’’50
At the same time, in challenging the veracity of the data and in assessing the
claims of the dominant discourse on human trafficking, critics risk being accused of
moral relativism, and losing public sympathy for what are necessarily complicated
48 The State Department has begun to acknowledge how human trafficking can be misconstrued. In a
section titled Costs of Myths and Misconceptions about Trafficking in Persons, the 2012 TIP Report states
‘‘Domestic law enforcement, not border interdiction, is usually what catches traffickers and frees victims
from modern slavery’’ (TIP 2012:27).
49 See also Levi-Strauss (1995), Geertz (1974) and Malinowski (1962) on the significance of symbols and
myths as these circulate within cultural systems as moral codes, rules of normativity and portals to the
sacred.
50 Morris actually uses the term false narrative in critiquing the veracity of the story of Jeffery
MacDonald, calling into question not only the trial evidence but versions of the narrative by reporter Joe
McGinnis (1983) and the investigative journalist and legal writer Janet Malcolm (1990).
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victims that so easily get conceptualized within the neoliberal frameworks of late
capitalism and its attending notions of justice as rights (Bernstein 2010). To
understand the dominant discourse of human trafficking, we clearly need to connect
it to other cultural processes and to the actual arenas in which international and
domestic policies intersect with both violence against women, in general, and other
types of victimization and criminalization and the larger political contexts in which
these ideas disseminate. In this paper, I have tried to show how these ethnographic
approaches can reveal not only how a master narrative operates, but what happens
beneath it, and to consider our representations of human trafficking versus the
nuances in specific sites so that better interventions can be marshaled to respond to
human trafficking beyond discourse.
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